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EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: WHEN
CAN JOHNNY SUE?
I. Introduction
Our public school system often fails miserably in its primary
objective - that of educating the students. As a result, a new type
of suit has developed, the suit for educational malpractice.' The
action is brought by parents of children who were pushed through
school and allowed to graduate though deficient in all basic skills.'
To date, these suits have been unsuccessful in the courts.3 Despite
this lack of recognition, proponents of educational malpractice as a
new theory of recovery are increasing.'
The recent case of Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
District5 is a good example of the educational malpractice suit. In
this case school authorities pushed the plaintiff through high school
and awarded him a certificate of graduation, despite his numerous
failing grades. Although school authorities were cognizant of the
plaintiff's learning disabilities, they made no attempt to test or
diagnose his problems or to provide remedial help. The plaintiffs
suit for educational malpractice was dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
1. See, e.g., C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970); J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL
(1964).
The quality of education in the public school system has long been a source of widespread
concern to society. Education has also been the subject of major litigation. See, e.g., Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (effects of "separate but equal" doctrine on quality of
education offered to black children); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (effects which school system's reliance on local property taxation, resulting in
interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures, would have on quality of education offered
those students residing in school districts having low property tax base); Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (recovery
sought for school district's failure to provide student with basic academic skills).
2. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584
(Sup. Ct. 1977), alf'd, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1978) thereinafter cited as
Donohue]; Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976).
3. Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (citing Beaman v. Des Moines Area
Community College, Law No. CL 15-8532 (Iowa Dist. Ct. March 23, 1977); Garrett v. School
Bd. of Broward Co., Case No. 77-8703 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 1977); Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976)).
4. Baratz and Hartle, Malpractice in the Schools, PROOREssivE, June, 1977, at 33-34;
Suing the Teacher, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1977, at 101; Saxe, Malpractice in the Classrooms,
Newsday, Nov. 30, 1976, at 49, col. 1.
5. 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1978).
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This Comment will consider the alternative theories which form
the basis of a suit for educational malpractice6 and weigh the argu-
ments for and against this proposed form of legal redress.' Three
avenues of recovery will be explored: a negligence action for mal-
practice, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and an
action sounding in negligence for breach of statutory duty.
II. Negligence Action for Educational Malpractice
The particular requirements for any negligence claim are three-
fold. The plaintiff must show that (1) a legal duty on the part of the
defendant existed and the defendant breached the duty; (2) plain-
tiff in fact suffered an injury; and (3) the defendant's breach of duty
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.8 This Comment
builds upon the premise that an inability to read or write at an
adequate level constitutes an injury; therefore, the focus will be
placed on the first two aspects of the negligence claim when estab-
lishing an educational malpractice action.
A. Duty of Care: No Single Answer
1. An Overview
The first element of any negligence case, including an educational
malpractice action, is a duty recognized by law.' That is, an individ-
ual or entity must meet a certain standard of conduct in order to
protect others against an unreasonable risk of harm." In the context
of an educational malpractice suit, the courts must recognize that
educational institutions have a legal duty to protect students
6. For a related discussion, see Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REv.
755 (1976).
7. This Comment focuses primarily on suits by illiterate high school graduates. For an
example of a case indicative of the equally expanding field of suits against universities, see
Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959).
8. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
9. Id. § 53, at 324-26. Prosser states that duty is "an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection." Id. at 325. So far the only clearly recognized duty which a school system owes
its students is one of physical safety while at school. See Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist., 2 Cal. App. 3d 741, 745-47, 470 P.2d 360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970); Raymond
v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963).
10. See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 30, at 143. Negligence is conduct involving risk. A
recognizable danger of injury comprises risk. Promoting students through the school system
regardless of aptitude involves the risk that the students will graduate from high school
without the ability to function in society.
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against the unreasonable risk of graduating from high school defi-
cient in basic skills. The courts must recognize and define the obli-
gation of the school system and its teachers to students and set forth
the circumstances of school liability.
A major issue concerns whether a school district has the duty of
educating a student to a certain required minimum level of profi-
ciency." The school has undertaken the obligation to educate. Pro-
ponents of the cause of action argue that the school thereby assumes
the corollary obligation to educate'in a reasonable, careful and pru-
dent manner." If a child has not achieved the requisite level of
proficiency, he should not be given a high school diploma and ush-
ered out of the school system.'3 These arguments assume that a duty
of due care in teaching lies with a child's teachers, and more funda-
mentally, with the school district as a whole which offers such re-
lated services as psychological counseling, remedial courses and
other similar programs.' 4
Recognizing that a legal duty of care exists in a particular factual
situation is a question of law and is a decision for the courts to
make.' 5 The finding of such a legal duty is a complex one; "duty"
11. Donohue, Plaintiff's Petition at 3. Plaintiff contends that he should have had an
adequate enough understanding and comprehension of his various courses so that he could
have achieved passing grades in these subjects and thereby qualified for a certificate of
graduation.
12. Id. at 3, 4. The type of liability arising from educational malpractice is based upon
misfeasance. Liability is much easier to find in cases of misfeasance than in cases of nonfeas-
ance, since courts are reluctant to recognize nonfeasance as a.basis of liability. Nonfeasance
cases generally concern the duty to aid someone in peril and the courts generally refuse to
recognize the moral obligation to aid someone in danger. Departures from this rule only occur
where some special relationship exists between the parties. Although no duty enures from
assisting someone in trouble, legally recognized duty exists to avoid any affirmative acts
which make an individual's situation worse. These affirmative acts constitute misfeasance,
rather than nonfeasance.
In applying the foregoing to educational malpractice cases, the fact that a school district
has actually enrolled students in its school means the school district has arguably crossed the
line into the field of misfeasance. Thus, when the school district fails to exercise proper care
in educating its students, the case is one of misfeasance, rather than nonfeasance. See
PROssER, supra note 8, § 56, at 340-48.
13. Donohue, Plaintiff's Petition at 4.
14. Id. at 3, 4. See also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App 3d
at 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856. In this case the plaintiff claimed that the defendant school
district, its agents and employees, neglected to provide the plaintiff with "adequate instruc-
tion, guidance, counseling and/or supervision in basic academic skills such as reading and
writing, although said school district had the authority, responsibility and ability Ito do
so]." Id.
15. 60 Cal. App. 3d. at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
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is not a term of "common parlance."' 6 In Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified School District, the California Court of Appeals reviewed
the many complex factors it had to consider in deciding whether to
allow a claim of educational malpractice. 7 The court stated: 18
Inherent to this [decision to impose a duty of due care] are various and
sometimes delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the activity out
of which the injury arises, compared with the risks involved in its conduct;
the kind of person with whom the actor is dealing; the workability of a rule
of care, especially in terms of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical
means of preventing injury; the relative ability of the parties to bear the
financial burden of injury and the availability of means by which the loss
may be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and judicial precedents
which color the parties' relationship; the prophylactic effect of a rule of
liability; in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its powers,
the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by bud-
get; and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share with their fellow
citizens-such are the factors which play a role in the determination of duty.
Thus, judicial recognition of the existence of a duty of care in any
given factual situation is dependent upon principles of public pol-
icy.
2. Influence of Compulsory Education Statutes
The argument for the recognition of a legal duty in the educa-
tional malpractice field is strenghthened by compulsory education
statutes requiring students to attend school until they reach the age
of sixteen.'9 Forcing children to attend school is inherently illogical,
if not illegal, where evidence indicates that the school fails to edu-
cate and where the school has no duty to educate." The compulsory
education system was not created merely to babysit. Educational
malpractice cases confront the system as being only half functional:
the schools keep children off the streets only to put them back onto
the streets as young adults unable to obtain decent jobs.
16. Id. at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (citing Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 858 (1963) (emphasis in original)).
19. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 1970). Every state in the union except
Alabama has a compulsory education statute. See Note, The Right to Education: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 796, 799 n.17 (1975).
20. See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1978); Peter W. v.' San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
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The justification for compulsory education laws lies in the recog-
nition of the parents' duty to educate his child for the child's sake,
and the parent's duty to have his child educated for the benefit of
the state."' In Fogg v. Board of Education,22 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court squarely held the primary purpose of maintaining
a public school system to be "the promotion of the general intellig-
ence of the people constituting the body politic .... ",23
The dual duties of a parent both to his children and to the state
are the theoretical bases for our compulsory education laws. If a
parent can show that sending his child to public school will not
fulfill these duties, then compulsory attendance becomes paradoxi-
cal. This anamolous situation in turn calls into question the consti-
tutionality of our compulsory education laws:" the due process pro-
hibition against arbitrary confinement focuses on whether the edu-
cational program justifies compelling the student to attend school.25
The due process argument has been successfully asserted in right-
to-treatment cases which defend the rights of those involuntarily
committed to state institutions in civil proceedings.26 The gravamen
of the complaint in these cases is as follows: where an institution
fails to treat those whose liberty has been taken away for the ex-
press purpose of rehabilitation, no justification for their confine-
ment exists.27 "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide 'adequate treatment violates the
very fundamentals of due process. '2
21. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); People v. Ewer, 141 N.Y. 129, 36
N.E. 4 (1894). In construing the constitutionality of a state compulsory education statute,
the Indiana Supreme Court stated: "One of the most important natural duties of the parent
is his obligation to educate his child, and this duty he owes not to the child only,. but to the
commonwealth . . . . The welfare of the child and the best interests of society require that
the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the child the opportunity to acquire
an education." State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. at 329-30, 61 N.E. at 732.
22. 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912).
23. Id. at 299, 82 A. at 174-75.
24. For a discussion of the compulsory education system, see Comment, The Rights of
Children: A Trust Model, A'Child's Rights in the Compulsory Education System, 46 FORDHAM
L. REv. 669, 694 (1978).
25. For a discussion of the constitutional arguments for a right to quality education, see
Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
28. Id. at 785.
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The unconstitutional confinement argument with reference to
education was discussed in In re Gregory B."5 The court posed sev-
eral hypothetical situations, such as a strike or a 75% staff cut
resulting in a non-educational, baby-sitting operation in which the
inadequacy of the educational program would be tantamount to
confinement in violation of due process.39 The court concluded that
compelling students to attend school where the educational pro-
gram amounted to non-education constituted confinement in viola-
tion of constitutional due process."
Those in favor of strengthening the legal arguments for quality
education must use compulsory education laws to bolster the re-
quirement that a state consider the educational needs of all its
school-age citizens. Proponents maintain the promise of a quality
education is implicit in the compulsory education laws.32
3. Minimum Levels of Proficiency
Court decisions focusing on other educational issues are germane
to judicial recognition of a school district's legal duty to educate its
students to a minimum level of proficiency. The Supreme Court
addressed itself to this issue in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.33 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, ap-
proved the constitutionality of an educational system which pro-
vided "each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal
skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process."3 No interference with funda-
29. 88 Misc. 2d 313, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
30. Id. at 316-17, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
31. Id.
32. "When the state chooses to provide education and makes attendance at school com-
pulsory, it has a duty to grant to each child an equal educational opportunity. ... Lau v.
Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 804 (1973) (Hill, J., dissenting).
33. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This case involved a class action by minority students in a school
district with a low property-tax base. The plaintiffs claimed discrimination on the basis of
wealth, under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, in the education provided
students. They charged that their education was not on a par with school district in areas
with higher tax bases. The Supreme Court, reversing the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, held that education is not a fundamental constitutional right. Id.
at 35. An absolute deprivation of educational opportunities must exist before discrimination
occurs under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 19-20. The plaintiffs were only "relatively
worse off" than students in wealthier school districts. See id. at 22. Justice Powell concluded
that the equal protection clause cannot provide for precise equality, at least of wealth. Id. at
24.
34. Id. at 37.
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mental rights was found where only relative differences in educa-
tional spending levels exist within a state's financing system." As
long as every student was provided with an education that met
minimum standards, no deprivation existed."
While the Court in Rodriguez denied that education was a funda-
mental constitutional right,3" and stated that quality of instruction
need not be absolutely equal, Mr. Justice Powell's statement re-
garding the provision of an opportunity to acquire basic minimal
skills is significant for educational malpractice cases. This state-
ment implies that there is a certain level of "adequate" schooling
that is required.3 However, Rodriguez is distinguishable from the
educational malpractice suit because it is a tax-equalization case
and a class action .3 Thus, the minimum standard described in
Rodriguez does not necessarily apply to the individual student.
The legal duty to provide a minimum level of education has been
sustained by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill.'
The case concerned the validity of the New Jersey system of financ-
ing public education primarily via local ad valorem property taxa-
tion." Local taxes yielded sixty-seven percent of the statewide total
of operating expenses. The state paid twenty-eight percent of the
expenses and federal aid paid the balance of five percent. The New
Jersey State Constitution mandates the legislature to provide a
thorough and efficient system of education for its students." The
court considered whether the state had fulfilled its obligation to
afford all pupils the level of educational opportunity comprehended
by the constitutional mandate in light of its financing system.'3
Relying on the significant connection between money expended per
student for education and the quality of educational opportunity,
the court held that the constitutional mandate had not been ful-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 35.
38. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
39. 411 U.S. at 5, 6 (1973).
40. 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973).
41. Id. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276.
42. "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this state
between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, par. 1.
43. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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filled and that the financing system was unconstitutional." Al-
though the content of the constitutional mandate had never been
delineated, "the Constitution's guarantee must be understood to
embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the con-
temporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a
competitor in the labor market."'5
In another tax equalization case, McInnis v. Shapiro," the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
the Illinois Constitution mandating a "thorough and efficient" 7 sys-
tem of free schools whereby all children would receive a "good"' 8
education did not establish rigid requirements for equal dollar ex-
penditures for each student.49 However, in finding. that the Illinois
scheme for financing public education was consistent with the state
constitutional mandate, the court noted that the Illinois General
Assembly had provided a foundation expenditure level of $400 per
student." Thus, since a minimum educational level was assured by
the foundation level funds, variables in the dollar input over and
above that amount were not violative of the state's constitutional
mandate.'
Courts have implicitly recognized the state's commitment to pro-
vide a meaningful education in Lau v. Nichols" and Serna v. Por-
tales Municipal Schools 3 by emphasizing the quality of education
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct.
1978), wherein the court stated that. the education clause of the New York Constitution
(art. XI, § 1) "must be regarded as also guaranteeing to all the children of the State an equal
opportunity to acquire basic minimal educational skills." Id. at 533, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
46. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
47. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
48. Id.
49. 293 F. Supp. at 336.
50. Id. at 330, 336.
51. Id. at 336.
52. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Lau was a class action; the plaintiffs were minors of Chinese
origin and spoke no English. They claimed they were receiving unequal educational oppor-
tunities. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a determination of appropriate
relief.
53. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). The plaintiffs in this class action were minors of
Hispanic heritage who spoke only Spanish. The children had been admitted into school. Their
parents, however, claimed that the children's right to education was denied since subjects
taught only in English were meaningless to them. The court found that the school systems
did not offer a meaningful education, and were thus discriminating. The court stated: "[Ilt
is incumbent upon the school district to reassess and enlarge its program directed to the
specialized needs of its Spanish-surnamed students at Lindsey and also to establish and
operate in adequate manner programs at the other elementary schools where no bilingual-
bicultural program now exists." Id. at 1282.
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being offered by the particular schools. The United States Supreme
Court in Lau held that the school district denied Chinese-speaking
children a "meaningful opportunity" to participate in the educa-
tional program because they did not understand English.5'
"Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can effectively
participate in the education program, he must have acquired those
basic skills is to make a mockery of public education.""5 Thus, it was
not sufficient for the defendant school district to provide the plain-
tiffs with the same educational terms and conditions that were
available to the thousands of other students in the San Francisco
Unified School District.56 The court held that equality of treatment
was not satisfied simply by providingthe identical facilities, teach-
ers, textbooks and curriculum for these students. 5 The existence of
certain state educational requirements contributed to the court's
holding. California required English to be the language of instruc-
tion in schools,58 insured mastery of English by all students,9 and
required proficiency in English for receipt of a diploma."0 Thus, the
Court in requiring that all students be given a "meaningful oppor-
tunity"'" to participate in the school's educational program, has in
effect set up a minimum standard of education.
Serna presented a similar factual situation. Plaintiffs in this suit
were Spanish-speaking minors whose parents claimed that the
school district was discriminating against children who spoke only
Spanish by failing to provide "learning opportunities which satis-
fied both their educational and social needs." 2 Although the defen-
dant school district had made some efforts to alleviate the language
problem, the court held that these corrective measures were inade-
quate. The district court found "a deprivation of equal protection
for a school district to effectuate a curriculum which is not tailored
to the educational needs of minority students." 3 The district court's
54. 414 U.S. at 566.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 71 (West 1975) (amended version codified at id. § 30 (West
1978)).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 8573 (West 1975) (amended version codified at id. § 51225 (West 1978)).
61. 414 U.S. at 566.
62. 351 F. Supp. at 1280.
63. Id. at 1283.
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focus on the special and particular needs of these students is in
accord with the Supreme Court's emphasis in Lau on the necessity
of providing students with a meaningful opportunity to learn and
points to the recognition of a minimum standard of education.
While both these cases are distinguishable from the educational
malpractice suit, principles contained therein can be applied to it.
Serna involved a minority group and was decided on a claim of
deprivation of due process and equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment." Lau also involved a minority group and was
decided under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,65 which
bans discrimination based on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, in any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance.6 Since both of these cases were class actions, the meaningful
opportunity spoken of referred to a standard of education involving
the entire school, and not just individual students. However, the
courts have in effect set up a minimum standard of education in
Serna and Lau which can be applied to the case of the functionally
illiterate high school student. A school district has fallen below the
requisite minimal educational level referred to in the foregoing cases
when it advances students from grade to grade without providing
them with the opportunity to acquire basic skills. This artificial
advancement results in an education which is meaningless and in-
comprehensible.
4. Difficulty of Measuring a Standard of Care
If the courts recognize a legal duty of care in educational malprac-
tice cases, they then have to determine the standard of care upon
which a breach will be measured. 7 Here an analogy can be drawn
to medical malpractice cases, where the standard of care requires
doctors to exercise the care and skill ordinarily exercised by other
members of the profession.68
Theoretically, teachers or school authorities could be held to a
standard resembling that of doctors. However, the basis for deter-
mining educational standards among educators is unsettled. The
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1970).
66. Id.
67. See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 37, at 205.
68. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vi.D. L. REv. 549 (1959).
See also PROSSER, supra note 8, § 32, at 162.
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greatest problem with requiring teachers to exercise the care and
skill ordinarily exercised by other members of their .profession is
that, unlike the medical profession, educators cannot agree on what
care and skill ordinarily is required in a given situation." In medical
malpractice cases, an expert witness can take the stand and provide
evidence on the correct and accepted standard of performance to
which the particular doctor should have adhered. No such expert
can offer a single clear-cut educational standard for the teacher to
follow.Despite the fact that three or four possible educational theories
exist, a minimum standard of care can be set. The best educational
theory would certainly not advocate hoping for the best and pushing
an illiterate student through each grade without any remedial pro-
grams. 0 School boards often do precisely this.7 Since this artificial
advancement is often the basis upon which parents bring this kind
of action," school authorities should not be able to claim that a lack
of a determinate standard of care prevents finding them liable. An-
alogously, doctors are often faced with judgmental decisions, where
several courses of treatment are open to them. In such instances, an
ascertainable minimum standard of care has been set, regardless of
the existence of other choices. 3 A standard may reasonably be found
for the educator as well.
5. Influence of New York Education Regulations
Two New York education regulations would affect the courts'
recognition of a legal duty in educational malpractice cases by es-
69. Shanker, Dangers in the "Educational Malpractice" Concept, AMERICAN TEACHER 4
(June 1975) [hereinafter cited as Shanker]. See also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 60 Cal. App. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861 n.4 (citing R. GAONi, THE CONDMONS
OF LEARNING (2d ed. 1970), R. FLESCH, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ (1st ed. 1955)). There are those
who favor holding slow learners back, others who rely on the "streaming" theory which places
students of similar learning ability together, still others who favor a variety of remedial
programs to aid those who lag behind. Shanker, supra at 4.
70. Shanker, supra note 69, at 4.
71. See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1978); Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
72. See cases cited in note 71 supra.
73. So long as the treatment a doctor uses is approved by a respectable minority of the
medical profession the defendant doctor cannot be charged with malpractice. However, the
ascertainable minimum is clearly a treatment which has the approval of a respectable minor-
ity of doctors. See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 32, at 163.
74. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 3.45 (amended July 2, 1976, effective June 1, 1979), 103.2 (1962).
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tablishing a standard of care by which to measure the breach of this
duty.
The present regulation states:75
High School Diplomas. In order to secure a State diploma of any type the
following requirements must be met: (a) The satisfactory completion of
an approved four-year course of study in a registered four-year or six-year
secondary school, including English, social studies including American his-
tory, health, physical education and such other special requirements as are
required by statute and [Regents regulations] established by the Commis-
sioner of Education.
This regulation clearly requires a "satisfactory completion" of a
course of study.
The recently enacted regulation, to become effective on June 1,
1979, states:7
Diplomas. No high school diploma shall be conferred which does not repre-
sent four years or their equivalent in grades above grade eight, and no such
diploma shall be conferred upon a pupil who has not achieved a passing
rating in each of the basic competency tests established by the commissioner.
This regulation clearly establishes passing grades on competency
tests as a requirement for receiving a diploma.
At first glance these regulations appear to give the courts some
basis for recognizing a legal duty to educate students to a minimum
level as well as to establish some standard of care. They impliedly
suggest the illegality of advancing a student through school with
failing grades. However, a recent decision" by the New York Court
of Appeals casts doubt upon the likelihood of judicial interpretation
and enforcement of educational statutes.
In James v. Board of Education,78 the New York Court of Appeals
held that New York courts were generally without authority to rule
on a policy decision formulated by the Chancellor of the New York
School District in the exercise of his constitutional and statutory
power,79 unless such decisions were arbitrary or illegal. The parents
and teachers of students in various school districts and the superin-
tendent of the school district sought injunctive relief to prevent the
75. Id. § 103.2 (1962).
76. Id. § 3.45 (1962).
77. James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 366, 366 N.E.2d at 1297, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
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scheduled administration of comprehensive reading and mathemat-
ics examination.'" The Chancellor of the City School District of the
City of New York is required by statute to administer these compre-
hensive examinations.8 ' Results are used to assess the programs in
basic skills, reading, and mathematics in the school district and to
satisfy federal requirements in connection with federal educational
assistance programs."2 The plaintiffs claimed that these exams had
been fatally compromised because some classes had received ad-
vance disclosure of the examination materials, and the use of the
results would thus prejudice decisions in which the results were a
factor.83 Since the legislature placed first responsibility on the Board
of Education for this statute's enforcement,8' the court held that
judicial interpretation of the statute would be an unlawful interfer-
ence with an educational policy judgment. Educational policy must
be set by the appropriate school authorities in the exercise of their
constitutional and statutory powers." The court thereby retained
matters concerning the general school system of the state within the
control of the department of education and removed these matters
from controversies in the courts. 6 In a like manner, the supervisory
authority to assess an adequate level of education may very well be
interpreted as a matter best left to the Board of Education itself.87
80. Id. at 362, 366 N.E.2d at 1294, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
81. 'N.Y. EDuc'. LAW § 2590-j (5a) (McKinney 1976).
82. 42 N.Y.2d at 359, 366 N.E.2d at 1293, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
83. Id. at 364, 366 N.E.2d at 1296, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
84. Id. at 359, 366 N.E.2d at 1292-93, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 936. The court's interpretation of
the statute was based on the general legislative and constitutional system for the mainte-
nance of public schools, a system which secures review by the board of education and, on the
state level, by the commissioner of education. Id. at 366, 366 N.E. 2d at 1297, 397 N.Y.S. 2d
at 941. See also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-j (5a) (McKinney 1976).
85. Id. at 366, 366 N.E. 2d at 1297, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 941.
86. Id., citing Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N.Y. 566, 576-77, 122 N.E. 630, 633 (1919).
87. See Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y. 2d 259, 267, 206 N.E. 2d 174, 175-76; 258 N.Y.S. 2d 77,
80 (1965), in which the court of appeals explicitly stated that educational policies are solely
the province of the duly constituted educational authority of New York State. See also Board
of Educ. v. Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977). It should be
noted, however, that although the legislature has granted a great deal of power to the Com-
missioner of Education, the courts do retain a limited scope of review on educational matters.
The courts can review the Commissioner's acts when they are purely arbitrary. Vetere v.
Allen, 15 N.Y.2d at 267, 273, 206 N.E.2d at 176, 179, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 80, 85. A plaintiff in
an educational malpractice case would thus assert that a violation of 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.45,
by advancing a student from grade to grade regardless of his literacy, was a purely arbitrary
act reviewable by the courts.
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However, the United States Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols"8
did not hesitate to interpret section 8573 of the California Education
Code," which requires the achievement of standards of proficiency
in English as well as other designated subjects as a prerequisite to
receipt of a diploma of graduation from grade 12, in conjunction
with section 71,90 which makes English the basic language of in-
struction in all schools, and section 1210111 which provides for com-
pulsory full-time education between the ages of 6 and 16, as supply-
ing a standard by which to measure the adequacy of the education
being provided." In reference to the foregoing sections of the Califor-
nia Education Code the court states: "Under these state-imposed
standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing
students with the same facilities . ..; for students who do not un-
derstand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education."9 Thus, despite the courts' refusal to recognize the exist-
ence of a legal duty in educational malpractice cases, strong argu-
ments in support of its recognition can be proposed.
B. Causation: Who Is to Blame?
The second requirement for a cause of action sounding in negli-
gence is causation. 4 Causation is a question of fact. A reasonable
connection between the defendant's act or ommission and damage
to the plaintiff must be proven:95 the injury to the plaintiff must be
within a zone of risk created by the defendant." In educational
malpractice, the school system's failure to teach successfully is the
substantial cause of the student's failure to learn. 7 The court must
ask whether the plaintiff's inability to read and write is due pri-
marily or substantially to the negligence of the defendant school
88. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
89. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8573 (West 1975) (amended version codified at id. § 51225 (West
1978)).
90. Id. § 71 (West 1975) (amended version codified at id. § 30 (West 1978)).
91. Id. § 12101 (West 1975) (amended version codified at id. § 48200 (West 1978)).
92. 414 U.S. at 566. It should be noted that this case concerned a minority group. Thus,
the case was based on a suspect classification of constitutional dimensions. See notes 52-66
supra and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
95. PossEa, supra note 8, § 41, at 236.
96. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
97. See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
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system. This question in turn raises may legal problems concerning
contributory or comparative causes for lack of learning ability.
Many extraneous factors may contribute to a child's inability to
learn: the student's home environment, his physical, psychological,
or neurological problems, his innate disadvantages, and various cul-
tural factors.18 Thus, as the appellate division stated in Donohue:
"The failure to learn does not bespeak a failure to teach. It is not
alleged that the plaintiff's classmates, who were exposed to the
identical classroom instruction, also failed to learn. From this it
may reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff's illiteracy resulted
from other causes. '9
While it may be difficult to prove proximate cause in an educa-
tional malpractice suit, the injury to the plaintiff is very real. The
mere fact that certain elements of a cause of action are difficult to
prove should not be the crucial factor in categorically denying a
cause of action. The dissent in Donohue stated: "Whether the
failure of the plaintiff to achieve a basic level of literacy was caused
by the negligence of the school system, as the plaintiff alleges, or
was the product of forces outside the teaching process, is really a
question of proof to be resolved at a trial."' ° Certainly where an
illiterate student is permitted to graduate without remedial pro-
grams, and without recognition of his learning difficulties, a school
cannot easily deny its responsibility in the plaintiff's failure to
learn.
In the law of negligence, multiple contributing factors exist where
either one of them operating alone would be sufficient to cause the
identical result.10 The defendant's conduct is a material element
and a substantial factor in bringing the event about.0 The test for
causation is one of significance, rather than of quantity.0 3 If the
98. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
99. Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 39, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
100. Id. at 41, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
101. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 41, at 239.
102. Id. supra note 8, § 41, at 240; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 431 (1965). The
classic example of this type of situation is where the defendant sets a fire, which joins with
another fire to burn down the plaintiff's property, but either one of the fires could have
destroyed the property by itself. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn.
430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). Each cause was such an important factor in producing the result
that neither should be relieved of responsibility on the ground that the harm would have
occurred anyway. Id. at 438-39, 179 N.W. at 48.
103. McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P. 2d 869 (1969). "It is not how little or how
large a cause is that makes it a legal cause, for a proximate cause is any cause which in a
natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred." Id. at 71-72, 448 P.2d at 871-72 (emphasis added).
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defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plain-
tiff's injury, liability will not be removed simply because other
causes have also contributed to the same result.' 4
Despite the law of negligence regarding multiple contributing fac-
tors, boundaries must always be set to liability. Legal responsibility
is limited to those causes which are closely and significantly related
to the result.0 5 The determination of this limit is often one of pol-
icy.'10 Fear of excessive litigation caused by the creation of a new
zone of liability and the difficulty of proving proximate cause are
two general policy considerations which have been a substantial
impediment to the success of an education malpractice suit.' 7 Part
IV of this Comment will treat such policy considerations in greater
depth.
III. Negligent Misrepresentation
An alternative cause of action for educational malpractice is
based on the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misre-
presentation is grounded on one of two theories of liability: negli-
gence or fraud.'0 8 These two distinct theories of liability give rise to
different limits of liability and different defenses.'9 However, it
would be extremely difficult to prove negligent misrepresentation
under the fraud theory because the plaintiff would have to prove
intent."10 Thus, this theory is probably not significant in educational
malpractice cases.
104. See Brand v. J.H. Rose Trucking Co., 102 Ariz. 201, 427 P.2d 519 (1967); Kinley v.
Hines, 106 Conn. 82, 137 A. 9 (1927).
105. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.W. 99 (1928).
106. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y. 2d 609, 249 N.E. 2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 34 (1961),
and text accompanying note 18 supra.
107. See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 40, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 882 (1978); Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
108. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 105, at 684.
109. Id. § 107, at 706-07. Under a theory of negligent misrepresentation based on deceit,
the plaintiff must prove an intent to deceive or intent to induce reliance on the defendant's
part. Id. at 706. This theory would encompass the situation where school authorities in-
tentionally misrepresented a student's lack of ability to parents. A defendant is liable to
anyone who could be influenced by his statements if they are intentionally false, id. at 703-
04, whereas liability is more restricted in cases based on the negligence theory. Id. at 706-07.
Although contributory negligence is a good defense in an action based on the negligence
theory, it is not a defense to an intentionally misleading statement because the plaintiff
has a right to rely on the statement. Id. at 706.
110. Id.
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A. The Negligence Theory: Requirements for the Cause of
Action
In order to establish a cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation, four elements must exist: (1) defendant's knowledge (or its
equivalent) of a serious purpose in the plaintiff's quest for informa-
tion; (2) an intent on the part of the plaintiff to rely on the informa-
tion sought; (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result of this reliance; (4)
a relationship between the parties which justifies both the reliance
by the plaintiff and the defendant's duty to impart the information
with care."'
The relationship between the parties is a primary consideration
in determining the extent of liability recognized by the courts."' A
defendant is not liable to everyone who could be influenced by his
negligently false statements.'"The special relationship between the
parties must justify reliance by the plaintiff; therefore, the defen-
dant must use due care when imparting information to the plain-
tiff. This duty has been found in the following situations: a pro-
spective relationship of trustee and cestui que trust,"' a prospective
contractual relationship, "s exclusivity of the defendant's knowledge
not founded on a contractual relationship,"' and a gratuitous repre-
sentation of a professional while practicing in his or her field."7
111. International Prod. Co.. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664 (1927).
112. Pnossma, supra note 8, § 104, at 706-07. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236,
135 N.E. 275 (1922); Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574
(1930); International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 622 (1927).
113. PRossER, supra note 8, § 107, at 707-08.
114. Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930). In this
case a trustee told a prospective buyer that certain bonds were adequately secured when in
fact they were not. The court held for the plaintiff. Although essential elements in the court's
holding were the defendant's knowledge of the seriousness of purpose for which the informa-
tion was requested and the plaintiff's reliance on the information, the court based its holding
on a finding of a prospective relationship of trustee and cestui que trust between the parties.
115. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Suit v. Scan-
drett, 119 Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947).
116. De Atucha v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 155 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3
A.D.2d 902, 163 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1957). In this case, the plaintiff relied on the bank's
negligent misrepresentation that a deposit had been made in the bank. The court found that
the relation between banker and depositor required the defendant bank to use due care in
giving information which was solely in its possession.
117. Valz v. Goodykoontz, 112 Va. 853, 72 S.E. 730 (1911); Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga.
App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897
(1938).
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The facts of the Donohue"' case, as alleged in the plaintiffs brief
and affidavit, illustrate a situation in which the requirements for a
negligent misrepresentation cause of action are met. Although this
legal theory was not discussed in Donohue, it could present a basis
for finding liability. In Donohue the parents claimed that the defen-
dant school district made false representations of fact concerning
methods to be used to improve the plaintiff student's educational
problems. In response to repeated parental inquiries, the school
psychologist allegedly assured the student's mother that school per-
sonnel would handle the student's problems via testing, discussions,
and other procedures which the school district had at its disposal.
These procedures were never carried out.
Even if the school district did not in fact know these representa-
tives concerning prospective remedial measures were false, it cer-
tainly should have known. Thus, knowledge or its equivalent was
present. A parent's inquiry into methods to be used for helping a
child's learning problems is obviously an inquiry for a seriouspur-
pose. Since the school authorities had testing facilities as well as
trained personnel at their disposal, the parent's reliance on the
school authorities' assurances was reasonable. The student was in-
jured by the misrepresentation in that he was unable to find suit-
able employment as a result of the poor education he received.
The relationship between the parents and the educators is argu-
ably one which justified both the school district's duty to give the
parents accurate information, as well as the parent's reliance on the
information. The relationship was potentially one of trustee and
cestui que trust"' and the defendant had exclusive knowledge of the
steps being taken to aid the student's academic difficulties.' 0
The factual situation in the Peter W. case is similar. 2' The school
district knew or should have known that representations made re-
garding the student's performance as at or near grade levelin basic
academic skills were false. The seriousness of purpose for which
information regarding the student's performance was sought is self-
evident. As in Donohue, the relationship between the parties justi-
118. Donohue, Plaintiff's Petition.
119. See note 114 supra.
120. See note 116 supra.
121. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1976).
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fied the parent's reliance on the information and created the school
district's duty to impart the information with care. However, the
action for negligent misrepresentation was dismissed in the Peter
W. case on the same policy grounds discussed with respect to the
negligence cause of action. 2 '
It is not clear in Peter W whether the student's parents made
regular inquiries about his progress as the Donohue parents alleg-
edly did. However, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
can be established even where such regular inquiries are not made.
A plaintiff in a negligent misrepresentation case does not have to
prove verbal misrepresentation; a document is enough to establish
the existence of a misrepresentation.' 3 The presentation of a high
school diploma arguably carries with it-an implicit guarantee that
the student receiving it has achieved a certain minimal level of
instruction. As Dean William Prosser stated: "Merely by entering
into some transactions at all, the defendant may reasonably be
taken to represent that some things are true-as, for example, that
a bank which receives deposits is solvent."'2 4 The plaintiff in an
educational malpractice suit would contend that by entering into a
transaction with a school a parent can expect that his child will
receive a rudimentary education. When the diploma is not an assur-
ance of certain capabilities, then it is valueless, not only for those
who do not meet its implied standards, but also for those who have
met them. The New York education regulations' 5 validate the pre-
sumption that a child whom the school promoted grade by grade has
basic knowledge of reading and writing' 26
B. Defenses to the Negligent Misrepresentation Cause of
Action
To escape liability, the defendant school district can claim a lack
of reliance by the parents on the information supplied by the school
authorities. 7 To show a lack of reliance, the court must find that
the parents would not have changed their course of action on the
122. Id. at 825, 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861, 862.
123. Leonard v. Springer, 197 I1. 532, 64 N.E. 299 (1902).
124. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 106, at 694.
125. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 3.45, 103.2 (1962). See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
126. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
127. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 108, at 714-15. See also Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236,
135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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basis of the school's statements.' u Thus, any indication of switching
schools would strengthen the parents' position. The school district
could also argue that it only rendered an opinion of what was essen-
tially an immaterial fact because the parents could have judged the
student's shortcomings themselves, a judgment requiring no exper-
tise in educational matters.'"
The defendant can also raise proximate cause arguments similar
to those employed in an ordinary negligence cause of action. For
example, many other factors, extraneous to schooling, are causes of
a particular student's failure to learn; 130 different philosophies of
school administration and instruction advocate different solutions
for poor learning."'
Additionally, contributory negligence is a good defense against a
claim of negligent misrepresentation. 3 2 Therefore, parental conduct
such as a failure to demand special testing and evaluation when the
parents know a child is receiving failing grades could be considered
contributory negligence. 13
C. Estoppel
An alternative cause of action in misrepresentation would be one
founded on estoppel. 3 1 Estoppel is an equitable remedy. Its applica-
tion in educational malpractice cases would prevent one party from
profiting by a situation arising from his own misleading state-
ments. 1
35
In cases like Donohue or Peter W, where a school district made
representations that were not in fact true, the school district would
128. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 108, at 714-15. See also Tsang v. Kan, 78 Cal. App. 275,
177 P.2d 630 (1947).
129. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 109, at 720-21.
130. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 69 supra.
132. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 107, at 706.
133. See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 38, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
134. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 105, at 691. Estoppel prevents a party from taking a parti-
cular legal position because of some impediment or bar which is recognized by the law. It
was originally used to prevent a party from challenging the validity of a legal record, or deed.
Later the equity courts used estoppel to prevent a party from taking inequitable advantage
of a situation in which his own conduct had placed his adversary. Thus, equitable estoppel
is defined as "an impediment or bar, by which a man is precluded from alleging, or denying,
a fact, in consequence of his own previous act, allegation or denial to the contrary." Id.
(quoting 2 JACOB, LAW DICTIONARY 439 (1811); J. EwART, PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL 4 (1st ed.
1900)).
135. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 105, at 691.
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be estopped from asserting the truth, which might be a defense to
some other action.'3 Thus, where a school district in effect told
parents that the child read at a normal grade level, the district
would be estopped from raising the defense of proximate cause in
the educational malpractice suit.
IV. Breach of Statutory Duty
A third theory of educational malpractice liability is a breach of
statutory duty. This Comment will focus on New York statutes and
cases which provide an example of how the courts have viewed
recovery under this theory of liability.
The New York State Constitution mandates the establishment of
free common schools in New York.'37 Enabling legislation estab-
lishes the public school system. 38 The constitutional mandate guar-
antees all children in the state the right to a free education,", a right
which cannot be invaded or denied to an individual child without
the safeguards of procedural fairness.4 ' Thus, it is clear that the
plaintiff student is entitled to an education. However, the court in
Donohue states that these legislative enactments merely require the
creation of a public school system. Their purpose is to confer the
benefit of a free education on the populace, not to protect against
the injury of non-education."'
A number of New York cases would support the school district's
argument for non-liability on statutory grounds. The leading case
is H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Company,"' where the New
York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff suing for breach of
statutory duty, could not recover from the defendant public service
corporation. The public service corporation was under a positive
136. Id.
137. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 states: "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may
be educated." Id.
138. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1976)..
139. In re L. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 348 N.E.2d 867, 868,
384 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (1976).
140. Madera v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 267 F. Supp., 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd
on other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1967).
141. Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 37, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
142. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). In this case, the defendant had entered into a
contract with the city of Rensselaer, New York, to provide water for various city purposes,
including firefighting. Plaintiff, a citizen, sued the company when his house burned down,
alleging that defendant had not provided adequate water pressure to extinguish a fire.
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statutory duty to furnish the city with water for extinguishing fires;
however, this statutory duty was merely one to furnish water and
there was nothing in the statutory requirements "to enlarge the zone
of liability where an inhabitant of the city suffers indirect or inci-
dental damage through deficient pressure at the hydrants."' 4 3 The
court's decision was based largely on policy reasons, restricting what
otherwise might be excessive liability.
A later case, Steitz v. City of Beacon,'4 relied on H.R. Moch Co.
and furthered the arguments contained therein. In Steitz, a city
charter provided that the city maintain and operate a fire depart-
ment.' 6 The court stated that the charter of the city was not de-
signed to protect the personal interest of any individual, and that
the legislature would clearly have to express an intention to "impose
upon the city the crushing burden of such an obligation."' 47 Again,
the court's concern for unrestricted liability on the part of a munici-
pality was apparent.
A third case supporting the school district's freedom from liability
on statutory grounds is Riss v. City of New York. "I Here, the plain-
tiff sued the City of New York because the police department failed
to supply her with protection from a former male friend who had
repeatedly threatened her.'49 Although she often requested the pro-
tection of the police, none was offered until after an attack by her
former "friend."' 50 She based her claim on the statute establishing
143. Id. at 169, 159 N.E. at 899.
144. 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. 2d 704 (1945).
145. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
146. 295 N.Y. at 54, 64 N.E. 2d at 705.
147. Id. at 55, 64 N.E. 2d at 706. The dissent in Steitz would have established an action
for educational malpractice on a statutory basis. Judge Desmond, dissenting, would have
grounded liability on a state statute requiring the City of Beacon to operate a fire depart-
ment. Judge Desmond found that cities of New York state have been held liable for defaults
connected with state-mandated services. This liability stems from an implied contract with
the state, based on the acceptance of the city's charter, whereby the city will carry out the
duties imposed by the charter. In its discussion of the implied contract, the dissent quoted
Corpus Juris: "a municipal corporation, when charged in its corporate character with the
performance of a municipal function, the duty being absolute or imperative and not merely
such as under a grant of authority is entrusted to the judgment and discretion of the muni-
cipal authorities, is civilly liable for injuries resulting from misfeasance or nonfeasance with
respect to such duty . I..." d. at 60, 64 N.E.2d at 708 (citing 43 CoRPus JuRIs § 1703, at
927 (1927) (Desmond, J., dissenting).
148. 22 N.Y. 2d 579, 240 N.E. 2d 860, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 897 (1968).
149. Id. at 581, 240 N.E.2d at 860, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 897.
150. Id. at 584, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 900.
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police protection. 5' Policy arguments prevailed. The court refused
"to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort,
even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based
on specific hazards ....
These cases strongly suggest that an individual student would not
be able to establish a cause of action based on a breach of a statu-
tory duty, because of the "well-established principles of torts that
statutes which are not intended to protect against injury, but rather
are designed to confer a benefit upon the general public, do not give
rise to a cause of action by an individual to recover damages for their
breach."'' 13 Nonetheless, other New York cases have interpreted the
State's mandatory statutory duties as intending to benefit and pro-
tect the public at large. These cases have allowed an individual to
recover damages for the breach of the statutory duty.'54
In Runkel v. City of New York, '" the plaintiffs sustained personal
injuries when an abandoned three-story multiple dwelling, border-
ing on a public street, collapsed on them. A city inspector had
actual notice that the building would collapse but did nothing about
it.' 5  The appellate division held the city liable for failure to order
the removal of the vacant building. The city's failure violated a
mandatory statutory duty, which required the city to abate a public
151. Id.
152. Id. at 582, 240 N.E. 2d at 860-61, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 898. However, the dissent opined
that withdrawal of sovereign immunity would not overburden municipalities. Therefore, a
suit should be allowed where a claim of negligence is as strong as in this case. Id. at 585, 240
N.E. 2d at 863, 293 N.Y.S. 2d at 901 (Keating, J., dissenting).
153. Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 37-38, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
154. Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1st Dep't 1953); Foley
v. State of New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E. 2d 69 (1945). See also Bernardine v. City of New
York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In this case the city was held liable for personal
injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff when he was run down by a police horse. Liability
was based on a statute which waived the municipality's immunity for employee negligence
in the operation of municipally owned vehicles or other facilities of transportation. In Mei-
stinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956), the city was held liable
for the wrongful death of an individual who was shot by a police officer during a gun battle
with robbers. The city was found negligent because it failed to properly train the police officer
in the use of small firearms. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), held the city liable for the wrongful death of an individual who was shot
and killed because he supplied the police department with information leading to the arrest
of a dangerous criminal. The city was found negligent because it failed to supply the decedent
with proper police protection.
155. 282 A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1st Dep't 1953).
156. Id. at 174-76, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88.
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nuisance of such an inherently dangerous character. The court
found the plaintiffs to be within the class of persons that the statute
was intended to benefit or protect. 15 7
In Foley v. State of New York,"'5 the state had a statutory duty
to maintain traffic control lights on state highways.'59 The New York
State Vehicle and Traffic Laws imposed this duty for the sole pur-
pose of protecting individuals.6 0 Since the intent of the statutory
enactment was to protect individuals, the court of appeals held that
the plaintiff had a cause of action in tort where the defendant state
violated its duty to maintain traffic lights on its highways. 6'
The classification of educational malpractice into one group or
the other is largely a question of policy. So far, policy arguments
have not favored educational malpractice cases. However, the New
York regulations 2 may presage a new trend of decisions in this
area. The regulations could be construed as having been enacted
for the sole purpose of protecting those students who were injured
by being promoted from grade to grade while lacking basic skills.613
A court could thus find, as did the court in Runkel,14 that the
plaintiffs were within the class of persons that the statute was
intended to benefit or protect. However, such a construction of the
statute by the courts would have to overcome the hurdles pre-
sented by James v. Board of Education 5 namely, whether a court
interpretation of the statute would be an unlawful interference
with an educational policy judgment. 6
V. Policy Considerations
Courts will consider questions of policy before they will permit the
establishment of any new cause of action.6 7 In denying a cause of
157. Id. at 177, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
158. 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E.2d 69 (1945).
159. Id. at 279, 62 N.E.2d at 70.
160. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. at 56, 64 N.E.2d at 706 (citing Foley v. State of
New York, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E. 2d 69 (1945)).
161. Foley v. State of New York, 294 N.Y. at 279-80, 62 N.E.2d at 70-71.
162. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.45 (1962). For text of regulation, see text accompanying note 76
supra.
163. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
165. 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977). See note 77 supra and
accompanying text.
166. See note 84 supra.
167. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Riss
[Vol. VII
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
action for educational malpractice, the Donohue case raised several
policy considerations: the ability of the courts to handle the amount
of new litigation, the possibility of feigned claims, and the difficul-
ties involved in proving the plaintiff's case;' economic considera-
tions, such as whether the particular defendant will be able to pay
the damages; 6 ' and preventative considerations, such as the ability
of the defendant to adopt practices which would preclude injury,
the possibility of establishing an agreed upon standard of conduct
which would prevent injury, the possibility of proving that the
defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury, and the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff."
One of the prime concerns of the court in H.R. Moch Co."'7 and
Steitz' was the economic problem of indefinitely enlarging the
number of potential claimants. When liability is extended indefi-
nitely, such liability arguably becomes a crushing burden on the
municipality or the particular department of the municipality that
is being sued. The appreciable depletion of the government's finan-
cial resources was a significant concern to the court in Riss.17'
Thus, a defendant school district can argue that recovery by an
individual student might reduce the amount of school money di-
rected at ongoing instruction. Conceivably, after a few sizable recov-
eries against one school district, the quality of education would
suffer. Channelling money into large recoveries instead of educa-
tional programs might be self-defeating, given the goal of the educa-
tional malpractice cause of action. Perhaps malpractice insurance
for schools would be one answer to the question of financing liability
for educational malpractice. Schools, via insurance, would then be
able to spread the loss.
v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); Steitz v. City
of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Donohue, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d
Dep't 1978); Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
168. 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968); H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y.
160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
169. Donahue, 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (2d Dep't 1978). See Tobin v. Gross-
man, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
170. Id.
171. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. at 165, 159 N.E. at 897-98.
172. See Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. at 55, 64 N.E.2d at 706.
173. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
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The administrative concerns, such as increased litigation, the
possibility of fraud, and difficulties of proof, which were raised in
the Donohue'74 case, were rejected as grounds for denying a cause
of action in Battalla v. State of New York.'75 Battalla was the first
case to allow a cause of action for physical or mental injury where
the injury was not caused by impact, but rather by fright negligently
induced.'76 The New York Court of Appeals stated:'77
We presently feel that even the public policy argument is subject to chal-
lenge. Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of
course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its
jurisdiction. The argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself to
a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a right and remedy in all cases
because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one.
Thus, the right to bring an action was enforced in this case. Prob-
lems of proof were left to the determination of the court and the
jury.178
An additional policy argument against the establishment of a
cause of action for educational malpractice is the preference for
using extra-legal processes to solve the educational malpractice
problem.' 7' The school system will assert that the remedies for edu-
cational malpractice are in the hands of the legislature or the execu-
tive body created by statute to run the school system. 80 However,
these extra-legal processes have so far failed to remedy the situa-
tion. Ideally, the court system, through the educational malpractice
suit, will make school systems more responsive to students' learning
problems and will constrain the schools to improve the education
they impart.
On the other hand, an inspection of medical malpractice suits
challenges the conclusion that the result of allowing individuals to
174. Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
175. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
176. Id. at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37 (quoting Green v. Shoemaker &
Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909)).
177. 10 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
178. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. See note 42 supra.
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sue institutions like food manufacturers, educational institutions, or
hospitals, leads to improved conditions. Critics of medical malprac-
tice suits contend that making doctors liable for malpractice has not
improved health care, but only created the need for malpractice
insurance and widespread "defensive medicine."
The California court in Peter W '"' succinctly summed up the
policy objections which have so far tipped the balance against edu-
cational malpractice cases. In recognizing that public schools have
incurred a large measure of public dissatisfaction and are held to be
responsible for many of the social and moral problems of society, the
court stated:' 2
To hold them to an actionable duty of care in the discharge of their academic
functions, would expose them to the tort claims - real or imagined - of
disaffected students and parents in countless numbers. They are already
beset by social and financial problems which have gone to major litigation,
but for which no permanent solution has yet appeared .... The ultimate.
consequences, in terms of public time and money, would burden them - and
society - beyond calculation.
However cogent these policy arguments may be, an effective
school system is vital to our society, and the problems which beset
it are in urgent need of solutions. Indeed, the United States Su-
preme Court in Brown v. Board of Education8 3 underscored the
significance of education:" 4
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments .... It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship .... In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
It may well be too much to ask our public school system to edu-
cate its students; and it may be unwise to impose an actionable duty
of care on the system. However, the courts could at least require as
much honesty and fair dealing between school authorities and par-
ents as between ordinary parties to a contract. An action for misre-
181. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 826, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1976).
182. Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (citations omitted).
183. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. Id. at 493.
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presentation would contribute a great deal towards establishing this
kind of honesty.'85
VI. Conclusion
The strong public policy considerations of excessive liability and
scarcity of funds are reasons successfully presented to quash educa-
tional malpractice suites. The problems of proof inherent in estab-
lishing causality for the plaintiff's poor learning create further diffi-
culties. Negligent teaching is a concept in flux, not yet determined
by expert testimony. The great number of educational theories in
the field obfuscate any single standard. The success of a plaintiff's
case will depend on stressing the wrong done to an individual in
light of the importance of the duty vested in the school system. The
action for negligent misrepresentation is the best of those surveyed
for proving liability, although this theory must still overcome the
obstacles of public policy erected by all courts considering the mat-
ter to date.
Joan Blackburn
185. See pt. II supra.
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